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DYNAMICS OF FOREIGN OPERATION MODES AND THEIR COMBINATIONS: 
INSIGHTS FOR INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Companies’ choice of foreign operation modes (FOM) has been a core subject of international 
business studies basically from its beginning (Hymer, 1960 [1976]; Root, 1964). A half-
century of research has brought us a set of established perspectives on companies’ foreign 
operation mode choices; the most important being the economics based approaches of 
internalisation and transaction cost theories (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Buckley and 
Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1982), evolutionary and resource based approaches (Andersen, 1997; 
Kogut and Zander, 1993; Madhok, 1997), institutional approaches (Kostova and Zaheer, 
1999; Meyer and Peng, 2005), and process models based on learning and decision behaviour 
theories (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 2009).  
The various approaches have been usefully summarized in comprehensive frameworks 
such as Dunning’s (2000) well-known OLI-framework (Ownership-Location-Internalisation) 
and the eclectic framework proposed by Hill, Hwang and Kim (1990). 
Alongside conceptual developments there has also been a surge of empirical studies, 
especially from the mid-1980s when research templates emerged through the ground-breaking 
studies by Davidson and McFetridge (1985), Caves and Mehra (1986), Anderson and 
Coughlan (1987), Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Hennart (1988) and Kogut and Singh 
(1988); see also Kogut (2001). Several overview articles (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; 
Canabal and White, 2008) and meta-analyses (Morschett et al., 2010; Tihanyi et al., 2005; 
Zhao et al., 2004) have been published recently, indicating that this has become a mature field 
of research. Well-established research templates and a dearth of innovative contributions 
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indicate that the field has developed paradigm-like characteristics. Recent research has above 
all expanded the empirical domains of entry mode studies.1  
It is uncontroversial to state that this research has been successful in improving our 
understanding of companies’ foreign operation mode choices and their implications, but it has 
also became increasingly apparent – as is typical of paradigmatic evolution – that potentially 
important issues remain rather overlooked by international business scholars. First, there has 
been a focus on the point of entry into specific foreign markets, with a corresponding 
disregard for what happens after entry.2 Of course, if firms make few changes and 
adjustments to their entry modes as times passes on, one could consider this a trivial 
oversight. However, some studies have shown that mode changes occur with sufficient 
frequency to merit much closer investigation (Benito, Pedersen and Petersen, 2005; Calof, 
1993; Clark, Pugh and Mallory, 1997; Fryges, 2007; Swoboda, Olejnik and Morschett, 2011).  
Second, the literature envisages operation mode decision-making as a static rather than 
dynamic process (Petersen, Welch and Benito, 2010). The issue is not just whether decisions 
(i.e. the outcomes of a decision-making process) are durable (i.e. are seldom re-considered; 
see above), but also how the decision-making process itself proceeds. In theory, operation 
mode choices are made based on considerations regarding how a range of internal and 
external contingencies are best matched with the particular characteristics (e.g. control, 
flexibility, costs, etc.) of given modes of operation. However, do decision-makers act 
according to beliefs based on “perfect” foresight (a priori optimization), do they live with 
their mistakes should match-disparities arise, or do they proceed in gradual, incremental ways 
                                                 
1 Initial work tended to focus on entry modes choices made by internationalizing manufacturing firms from the 
US, UK, and Northern Europe. Research then spread to service firms (e.g. Erramili and Rao, 1993), middle-
income countries (e.g. Campa and Guillén, 1999; Pla-Barber, 2001), and emerging markets (e.g. Filatotchev et 
al., 2007). 
2 Following the established research template, studies have typically used cross-sectional designs. Longitudinal 
studies are relatively rare, partly because of the difficulties and costs of obtaining reliable data over extended 
periods of time. Although some (cross-sectional) studies look exclusively at “real” entry modes (i.e. the mode 
used to enter a country in which a firm has never had operations), in praxis many studies take the modes of 
operations actually used when the studies were conducted, thus lumping entry modes and subsequent modes into 
the same category.  
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to pragmatically adjust to changing circumstances? In other words, are operation modes 
decided or managed, and if the latter, in what ways? 
Third, as pointed out by Petersen et al. (2008), the bulk of research has examined the 
possible effects of a large range of explanatory factors (independent variables) on foreign 
operation mode choice. An enduring and somewhat surprising characteristic of that research is 
that the dependent variable itself – foreign operation modes – has barely been discussed. 
Studies have tended to treat foreign operation modes as choices among a restricted set of well-
specified discrete alternatives; the choice between contractual and equity-based types of 
operation modes (e.g. Anderson and Coughlan, 1987; Davidson and McFetridge, 1985), or 
that between partly owned and fully owned operations (e.g. Benito, 1996; Gatignon and 
Anderson, 1988; Hennart, 1991). There is some evidence for a “messier” reality (Benito et al. 
2009; Clark et al. 1997; Kedron and Bagchi-Chen, 2011; Petersen and Welch, 2002; Welch et 
al., 2007), with companies using many different modes at the same time, and even 
concurrently for the same type of activity in a given location, but the systematic mapping of 
mode diversity and mode combinations has only just begun (Asmussen, Benito and Petersen, 
2009; Benito, Petersen and Welch, 2011; Hashai et al. 2010). Within the broad categories of 
modes – contractual, exporting and equity – there are many different sub-categories, each 
important in its own right. For example, contractual modes include licensing, franchising, 
management contracts, outsourcing and some forms of alliances. Exporting might be handled 
indirectly, such as via a trading company, or through different types of foreign intermediary 
arrangements. Equity-based modes range from minority equity alliances to majority or fully-
owned foreign subsidiary forms. The combination possibilities are immense, and are used 
extensively: for example, licensing and equity-based modes are common partners, as are 
franchising and equity-based modes (Welch et al., 2007).   
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In this article we take a critical view of the established operation mode literature, with 
a focus on the themes outlined above. We apply a strategic management approach to foreign 
operation modes. The strategic management approach to FOMs is far from new. Almost 50 
years ago, when Franklin Root introduced FOMs as a key IB-theme (Root, 1964), he basically 
applied a strategic management approach inasmuch as he provided prescriptions as to how 
firms could achieve competitive advantage in foreign markets through formulation and 
implementation of FOM strategies. Since then, however, FOM scholars have mostly 
subscribed to descriptive and – in particular – predictive approaches.  
Descriptive approaches have been applied when a new FOM emerged in the 
international marketplace and researchers addressed the how and why questions through in-
depth case studies. As an example, international management contracts were described 
through case studies in a range of industries in the 1980s (Brooke, 1985). Most FOM 
researchers, however, have focused on the question of when firms would prefer one FOM 
over another. Introduction of new theories – transaction cost theory in the 1980s, the resource-
based perspective in the 1990s, and new institutional theory in the 2000s – has driven this 
penchant for predictive approaches. Since the prime aim has been to test the explanatory 
power of these theories on FOM choices, the predictive approach could rightly be labelled a 
theory-testing approach. The theory testing approach inquires about variety in terms of 
theory-specific factors that may explain simple – often binary – and standardized FOM 
choices (outcomes). A strategic management approach, in contrast, looks for variety and 
uniqueness of FOM outcomes since standardized outcomes require a minimum of 
management discretion and no inimitable capabilities. As such, standardized FOM outcomes 




Our strategic management approach addresses a fundamental FOM management 
dilemma: the pursuit of operational efficiency through FOM variety that, in turn (and as will 
be elaborated on later), threatens to trigger excessively high transaction costs. Our discussion 
of this dilemma will be organized along “the three Cs” of foreign operation mode choice, 
change, and combination. We start by questioning the enduring myth of static decisions 
between durable discrete entry modes, and then proceed to look into how the puzzle of mode 
packages or combinations can be explained once certain commonly held preconceived ideas 
are discarded. We close with some reflections about the managerial and research implications 
of broader conceptualisation of foreign operation modes. 
2. SKETCH OF A MANAGEMENT DILEMMA 
FOM variety potentially leads to higher operational efficiency than FOM simplicity, but 
variety also implies higher transaction costs – i.e. costs of drafting, (re-)negotiating, enforcing 
and coordinating multiple FOM contracts. As an example, the operational efficiency (e.g. in 
terms of scale and scope economies) of licensing succeeded by a production subsidiary is 
higher in an initially small, but growing foreign market, than is the efficiency of the two 
modes individually and persistently; but the switch between the two modes is likely to incur 
take down and set up costs (Benito, Pedersen and Petersen, 1999).3 However, negotiating an 
exit option in the licensing contract may curb the “switching costs”. Conversely, an aloof, 
forced and sudden cancellation of the licensing contract may incur very high transaction costs 
in the form of high take down costs as well as set up costs associated with the move to an 
alternative mode or mode combination. Hence, FOM variety in the form of mode switches 
and mode combinations may differ substantially in terms of transaction costs depending on 
                                                 
3 These comprise the costs of taking down existing mode of operation (e.g. severance payments and other 
outlays involved in the termination or modification of existing contracts) and the costs of setting up a new mode 




whether they are well-prepared and well-orchestrated – or exercised in an improvised and 
awkward manner.  
The logic is illustrated in Figure 1. The figure depicts the marginal cost (MC) and 
benefit (MB) of FOM variety, i.e. the number of modes employed after entry of a given, 
foreign market. The MB curve (MB = marginal benefit of one additional FOM) reflects 
diminishing returns to scale: the MB curve has a strong downward slope and moves 
asymptotically towards zero (the x-axis). The marginal cost (MC) of adding one more FOM 
after entry is assumed constant. However, the cost level across the added FOMs is assumed to 
be strongly influenced by MNE managers. Managers’ potential influence on MC levels is 
indicated by including two different horizontal cost lines in the figure: MC > MC*. The upper 
cost line, MC, does not intersect with the MB curve at any point simply because the potential 
marginal cost (switching costs, coordination costs, etc.) exceeds the marginal benefit of any 
additional FOM – even the first, most beneficial. The lower cost line, MC*, intersects the MB 
curve at two additional FOMs. Hence, the MNE will be better off by adding one FOM beyond 
its entry mode and will neither be better or worse off by adding one more FOM (that is, a total 
of three FOMs). The level of transaction costs in the MC* case is significantly lower than in 
the MC case – indicating that the MNE managers in the former case are much better at 
preparing switches (e.g. by putting in exit options at market entry) and curbing costs of 
coordinating multiple FOMs. Consequently, a manager in the MC* case is closer to achieving 
the “best of both worlds” in the foreign market: maximum operational efficiency with a 
minimum of transaction and governance costs. 
------------------------------ 





3. TO CHANGE OR NOT TO CHANGE? CHARACTERISTICS, IMPETUS AND BARRIERS 
Received theories of foreign operation mode choices (or entry mode choices, as these 
decisions are usually, but often inaccurately, referred to) typically view such decisions as 
discrete as well as discriminate: that is, at a given decision point (which could be at entry or 
later) companies choose one among several alternative ways of organising their operations in 
a foreign market – the mode of operation – and the use of that mode is normally assumed to 
exclude the concurrent use of other modes.  
Some conceptualisations tend to be static; thereby emphasizing the initial point of 
entry and, if at all, projecting a persistence of the selected mode over the relevant time 
horizon. Others take a more dynamic approach and accentuate (or at least recognise) the 
conditions under which changes of foreign operation modes might be expected. Transaction 
cost theory and the resource-based and institutional approaches have tended to be on the static 
end of a static-dynamic continuum, whereas internationalisation process theory has been on 
the other end. Although their key explanatory variables and mechanisms differ,4 the former 
approaches have in common a focus on static – but typically long-term – discrete choices, and 
which consequently may seem to provide limited opportunities for mixing different FOMs.5  
The dynamic approach offered by internationalisation process theory could perhaps be 
seen as more “fluid” and hence as more open to mode combinations, and the case study 
approach favoured by many internationalisation process scholars often produces rich 
narratives that include descriptions of mode combinations, mixes and packages, but most 
                                                 
4 Transaction cost theory focuses on the need to safeguard specific assets against opportunistic actions; resource-
based theory emphasizes the appropriation of rents generated by the possession of valuable and unique resources 
and capabilities; institutional theory emphasizes the (structural and behavioural) adaptation to external demands, 
regulations, and norms. 
5 However, a distinct contribution is that of Hennart (1993) who argues that mixed methods of organisation are 
commonplace (i.e. the simultaneous use of rules as well as prices), and that activities (transactions) are seldom 
carried out in the extreme (caricatures) of either bureaucracies or spot markets. Nevertheless, it must be noted 
that Hennart’s thesis is that real-life solutions to the organisation-problem – say, the choice of a foreign 
operation mode – typically involve combinations (“mixes”) of different organisation methods, not that different 




studies have actually focused on the transition from one (main) mode to another; for example 
how an entrant firm’s gradual acquisition of foreign market knowledge and/or development of 
local networks reduce perceived market risk and uncertainty, which in turn could induce a 
switch from a low risk and commitment mode (e.g. a sales agent) to a high commitment mode 
(e.g. a wholly-owned sales and marketing subsidiary). Hence, the internationalisation process 
approach explains why (but not how) mode changes take place, whereas it is more silent as 
regards mode combinations.  
Even though the dynamics of foreign operation modes have been relatively neglected, 
that is not to say that received theories cannot deal with changes. Benito, Pedersen and 
Petersen (2005) combine transaction costs and resource-based theories with 
internationalisation process theory in their study of changes in international sales and 
distribution channels.6 They model changes in the way exporters organize such activities in 
foreign markets as driven by factors that motivate switches as well as factors that work 
against making switches. The former are called switch motivators while the latter are labelled 
switch deterrents.  
The two types of factors work in opposite directions. Motivators are factors that to 
some extent reduce the perceived utility of continuing with the current set-up, and which 
should therefore increase the probability of making change to the current foreign operation 
mode. Key factors include market growth, company growth, accumulation of market 
knowledge, disappointing performance, and increasing asset specificity. In contrast, switch 
deterrents are the set of factors that make it difficult or costly to carry out such changes; these 
factors have hence also been labelled “switching costs” (Benito et al., 1999).  
In their study of Danish exporters, which largely corroborated their model, Benito et 
al. (2005) found evidence of both within-mode changes (e.g. substituting an intermediary with 
                                                 
6 Other studies of mode changes include Calof (1993), Casillas, Moreno and Acedo (2011), Clark et al. (1997), 
Fryges (2007), and Swoboda et al. (2011).  
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another) and between-mode changes (e.g. moving from a contractual arrangement with a 
distributor to in-house operations), but only a limited extent of mode combinations.7 
However, Clark et al. (1997) uncovered a substantial amount of mode combinations, which 
they called mixed approaches; in a sample of 25 UK firms (that had made a total of 679 
foreign operations) they detected 203 mode changes, of which 36 (18%) entailed mode 
combinations.  
4. HOW LARGE A STEP AND HOW MANY? MANAGING THE INTERNALISATION PROCESS 
The concept of internalisation lies at the core of influential theories in international business, 
with their focus on choice of foreign operation modes (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Hennart, 
1982; McManus, 1972; Rugman, 1981); the aim being to use theory to explain the 
circumstances under which a firm replaces imperfect (or non-existent) external markets by 
internal coordination (Buckley, 1993). Together with market power explanations (Hymer, 
1960/1976; Yamin, 1994) and knowledge-based explanations (Grant, 1996; Kogut and 
Zander, 1993), internalisation theory offers a paradigm which explains - with a high degree of 
accuracy under certain assumed conditions - why MNEs choose to exercise tight managerial 
control over foreign operations rather than work through other firms under contractual or 
other arrangements. Hence, on a general level internalisation theory can explain the existence 
of MNEs (Rugman and Verbeke, 2003). By including time-responsive factors that pull in the 
direction of internalisation, the theory can also predict patterns and directions of the growth of 
MNEs. However, the theory downplays any meaningful role for management, particularly in 
the real world dynamic context of constantly evolving foreign market conditions and 
operations of a MNE (Buckley, 1993).  
 We argue, however, that internalisation theory could be taken a step further by 
including managerial judgement considerations in the context of dynamic influences on the 
                                                 
7 In their sample of 260 foreign operations, only six involved mixed or dual arrangements. It should be noted, 
however, that their study was not specifically designed to detect mode combinations. Instead, it aimed at 
examining the main modes of operation in a key foreign market.  
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development of foreign operations. The market transaction costs of using outside agents (local 
operators) are frequently negligible at market entry, but usually increase over time. A key 
question pertaining to such situations is: what management instruments may ensure persistent 
concurrence between a changing pressure for internalisation in a foreign market and the 
effectuated internalisation of an MNE in that market?  
Internalisation theory basically assigns three roles to MNE management. First, 
managers need to decide whether the MNE should produce at home and export to the foreign 
market in question or produce in the foreign market (see e.g. Horst, 1974). Second, the 
managers face a make-or-buy choice whenever localisation advantages favour production in 
the foreign market (Dunning, 1980). Third, managers have to decide the timing of 
internalisation (Buckley and Casson, 1981) in cases where the ‘buy’ choice precedes 
internalisation8. 
Seeing market exchange as the ‘default option’, internalisation theorists have first of all 
focused on the identification and analysis of various market imperfections that may result in 
internalisation. Since theorists have focused on a market efficiency rather than market power 
explanation (see e.g. Calvet, 1981), MNE managers have been assigned a ‘neoclassical’ role 
as omniscient administrators of market imperfections – and not creators of market 
imperfections9. In this perspective the managerial task in internalisation theory is first of all to 
observe the various relevant – mostly exogenous – choice factors, and only to a limited extent 
to involve oneself in complex managerial discretion. Exact observation of internalisation-
relevant factors (such as market size and degree of asset specificity) unequivocally directs the 
                                                 
8 Internalisation theory may include two additional management roles although one may consider these to be 
at the periphery of the theory, namely (a) the timing of initial export replacement with local production 
(‘offshoring’), and (b) the specific choice of mode of operation in the case of a ‘buy’ decision (Contractor, 
1990; Datta, Herrmann and Rasheed, 2002). 
 
9 In some models based on internalisation theory, MNE managers are assumed ‘bounded’ and not fully 




right choice. Furthermore, the choices are relatively simple ones: produce at home or in the 
foreign market; make-or-buy; when to internalise? Ideally, as depicted in figure 2, there 
should be a perfect concurrence between the particular need for internalisation at a certain 
point in time – which would be determined by the underlying internalisation drivers – and the 
actual internalisation: that is, firms should respond to a pressure P’ for internalisation by 
choosing a I’ degree of internalisation, and correspondingly choose I’’ for P’’, and I’’’ for 
P’’’. 
------------------------------ 
Figure 2 about here  
------------------------------ 
 
In the real world, the chosen levels of internalisation may of course differ from the optimal 
ones, e.g. due to incomplete information, changes in internal and external contingencies, and 
various impediments (e.g. switching costs) to carrying out changes. Hence, as shown in figure 
3, a company might have chosen a level of internalisation, e.g. point A, which is considerably 
lower than the ideal; or, conversely, chosen a much higher level of internalisation, e.g. point 
B, than really needed. In case A, the company should further internalise until point A*, 
whereas in case B, it should de-internalise until reaching B*. In figure 3, points C, A* and B* 
indicate optimal choices. 
------------------------------ 
Figure 3 about here  
------------------------------ 
 
In an ever-changing and complex world it seems unlikely that companies as a rule will have 
reached the ideal level of internalisation, so there is obviously considerable scope for 
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management to fine-tune operations in order to try to get as close as possible to the optimal 
line. Buckley (1993) and Rugman and Verbeke (2003) argue that there is considerable room 
for developing internalisation theory in a more management-oriented direction.10 In particular, 
Buckley stresses the need for theory development incorporating a more important role for 
management in the following two, closely interrelated issues: 
•  The theory maintains a rather static view of internalisation – being considered a state 
rather than a process. Hence, “to incorporate a theory of management, it is essential to move 
away from a comparison of states to a comparison of processes… Progress can be made by 
comparisons of the changing balance of the boundary between ‘firm’ and ‘market’ and 
intermediate states over given time periods” (Buckley, 1993, p. 201).  
•  There is an oversimplified choice for managers between markets and hierarchies. 
Hence, “the narrow view that managers simply make ‘buy or build’ decisions … needs to be 
extended” (Buckley, 1993, p. 206).  
The two issues point in the same direction, namely that internalisation may be a long-
term manageable process rather than a time-compressed, binary choice.11 A pertinent 
circumstance is when non-hierarchical entry modes enjoy a temporal superiority over 
hierarchical modes. For example, licensing or joint ventures may be used before wholly-
owned production subsidiaries, or independent distributors may precede sales subsidiaries. 
 When the transition from non-hierarchical to hierarchical foreign operation modes 
unfolds as a managed and stepwise process, this could suitably be termed staged 
internalisation. The potential pay-off to MNEs of undertaking staged internalisation may be 
                                                 
10 This was not to say that the role of management has been totally ignored inasmuch as “strategic behaviour can 
be identified within the internalisation framework by firms securing exclusive access to key inputs and tieing in 
customers” (Buckley, 1993, p. 206). 
11 Of course, in those situations where no markets – not even contractual ones – exist, internalisation from the 
outset is the sole foreign entry mode, and it is meaningless to talk about internalisation processes (other than 
post-internalisation processessuch as post-acquisition integration processes). Most often, however, non-
hierarchical entries (i.e. arm’s length, contractual modes, and shared ownership operations in foreign markets) 




considerable: at any point in time, the ideal outcome for the firm would be when the degree to 
which a firm has internalised its foreign activities is in perfect balance with the underlying 
drivers of internalisation. For example, a MNE typically undertakes several different value 
activities in a given foreign market. Some of the activities in that country may be 
characterised by a high degree of asset specificity whereas other activities could have low 
specificity. Due to the considerable scale and scope economies and local market knowledge 
typically enjoyed by a local, outside agent (e.g. a licensee of the MNE), the entrant MNE may 
initially choose to only internalise local activities for which a high degree of control is 
considered to be of utmost importance, such as R&D (Buckley and Hashai, 2005). However, 
the MNE may internalise more and more value activities in the foreign country as the degree 
of asset specificity of these activities increases, which typically occurs in small, consecutive 
steps.  
------------------------------ 
Figure 4 about here  
------------------------------ 
 
The logic is illustrated in figure 4. It is assumed that the underlying pressure for 
internalisation (or internalisation advantage) increases monotonically with elapsed time of 
operations in the foreign market through inter alia learning and an increased concern for 
control. Thus, the x-axis indicates elapsed time of operations in the market and the y-axis 
shows the degree to which the foreign market operations are internalised (measured as a 
continuum from 0-100 %). Exactly where on the y-axis does a company choose to operate 
given the evolving pressure for internalisation as time passes? Figures 5, 6 and 7 illustrate 
three different scenarios that in terms of the fit between underlying internalisation drivers 
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(indicated by the dotted line), such as increasing asset specificity, and effectuated (i.e. actual) 
internalisation of operations in a given foreign market.12  
------------------------------ 
Figure 5 about here  
------------------------------ 
 
Figure 5 depicts a scenario of immediate internalisation that, for example, may be justified by 
excessively high anticipated/potential switching costs (Benito et al., 1999). Such a scenario is 
typically assumed in the entry mode literature, especially that based on transaction cost 
economics, as illustrated by the following statement in the much-cited study of foreign 
distribution by Anderson and Coughlan (1987, 71): “Channel choices, once made, are often 
difficult to change. Hence, the question of whether to integrate foreign distribution can have a 
large and lasting impact on the success of a firm's international operations.”  
The situation depicted in Figure 5 is one in which internalisation, although 
economically justified by potential switching costs, actually is ‘premature’ inasmuch as the 
hierarchical operation mode – the wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) – in contrast to for 
example a local, independent licensee – operates below minimum efficient scale during the 
first years after market entry. Hence, the governance structure is sub-optimal in terms of 
operational/production costs, although perhaps not with regard to transaction costs (including 
switching costs). The sub-optimisation in terms of production costs (i.e. sacrificed scale 
economies) is indicated by the grey area. Figure 6 illustrates a scenario with one shift of 
governance structure – from a contractual mode (e.g. licensing) to the hierarchical mode 
(WOS). The shift halves the sub-optimisation (grey) area.13  
                                                 
12 This material (including the figures) is based on Petersen et al. (2010). 
13 This can be viewed as somewhat simplistic as it is clear that many companies using, for example, licensing 
employ a range of techniques within licensing arrangements to ensure that a degree of control or internalisation 




Figure 6 about here  
------------------------------ 
 
The sub-optimisation area is further reduced when the MNE makes two shifts of governance 
structures/operation modes (see Figure 7). The first shift is from a contractual arrangement to 
a 50:50 equity joint venture, and later from a joint venture to a sole venture (WOS) – i.e. a 
hierarchical organisation.  
------------------------------ 
Figure 7 about here  
------------------------------ 
 
Altogether, the three scenarios show that the sub-optimisation area diminishes as the number 
of shifts – or internalisation steps – increases. Of course, a perfect concurrence between the 
particular need for internalisation at a certain point in time – which would be determined by 
the underlying internalisation drivers – and the actual internalisation at that point in time 
would eliminate the sub-optimisation area completely. 
It is also clear that there is a trade-off between – on the one side – production cost 
savings due to perfect concurrence obtained through frequent internalisation steps, and – on 
the other side – the additional transaction costs in the form of renegotiation costs. A basic 
premise of our line of reasoning is that while achieving a perfect fit between the underlying 
internalisation drivers and the effectuated internalisation may have a high payoff in terms of 
production efficiency, it also constitutes a major managerial challenge of curbing the 
transaction costs associated with exercising numerous internalisation steps. Hence, 
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determining the number of internalisation steps is a managerial challenge that is part of the 
simplicity-diversity trade-off we outlined earlier (section 2).   
5. COMBINING MODES 
5.1. WHY ARE MODES COMBINED? 
As noted above, it has become increasingly clear that many companies are engaged in the use 
of various forms of mode combinations (Benito et al., 2011; Clark et al. 1997), and that they 
appear to be prepared to institute mode combination additions or deletions if conditions 
warrant such changes. On the other hand, academic researchers seem to be far more reticent 
about recognising this reality and its implications for international business theory and 
strategy 
It is not surprising that companies are attracted to the use of mode combinations: they 
may deliver a range of strategic benefits that managers can readily relate to – such as 
operational efficiency, flexibility, control, income generation, strengthening of intellectual 
property protection and as stepping stones to a major change in foreign operation mode. 
At a basic level mode combinations provide a significantly wider array of options to 
companies in how they might go about entering or extending penetration of a given foreign 
market. Mode combination options go beyond, sometimes well beyond, the mainstream or 
primary mode that a company might employ in a particular foreign market situation. The 
universe of mode combination options is immense, especially when added to market location 
options.14 Of necessity, managers tend to consider a far more restricted range of options, often 
                                                 
14 Following Petersen et al. (2008) and Hashai et al. (2010) the foreign operation mode matrix (i.e. the 
configuration) of an international firm that operates in I host markets and has J identifiable activities in its value 
chain, can at a given point in time be denoted M=(mij), where i=1...I indexes host markets and j=1...J indexes 
value chain activities. Each cell in the matrix (mij) may then contain one or multiple operation modes (k) under 
which the given activity is performed in the given host market. Since the number of relevant alternatives in a 
country is kJ, even seemingly simple country configurations quickly result in rather large number of alternatives. 
For example, the extremely simple case of a country mi = {production, R&D, sales}, i.e. 3 activities, which can 
be done either in-house or outsourced, i.e. k = 2, gives 23 = 8 combinations. Adding another mode (e.g. an 
alliance) results in 33 = 27 combinations. The number of potential combinations rises exponentially by adding 
further countries (and/or additional activities) to its portfolio, so a company would quickly face immense 
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driven by very specific market and/or foreign partner pressures (Larimo, 1987). The 
availability of mode combination options, assuming managerial recognition, provides greater 
flexibility to companies in the development of foreign market operations at the outset and 
beyond – providing an enhanced and broadened ability to adapt as circumstances change. 
Mode adjustments can be made without necessarily resorting to a potentially disruptive 
primary mode change. This could vary from fine tuning of existing mode use to important 
adjustments that flow from the inevitable market and mode learning processes that unfold 
over time. The JV literature points to the different ways that JV arrangements evolve as the 
parties build up experience with each other (Becerra, Lunnan and Huemer, 2008; Yan and 
Gray, 1994; Yan and Zeng, 1999).  
Mode additions to the primary JV mode, at any stage, are often made in order to 
strengthen control over the joint venture – such as by the addition of a licensing or 
management contract. Control was an important concern for the multinational express 
delivery company, FedEx, in revising and upgrading its operation in China in 1999. At that 
stage it was not prepared to commit to a fully-owned operation. It felt that having a Chinese 
partner was crucial in delivering political and other benefits to its service business, but a 
50:50 JV fell short in delivering the control it regarded as also critical. Thus, a management 
contract was negotiated alongside its 50:50 JV with a Chinese partner: the management 
contract was seen by FedEx as effectively delivering control of day-to-day operations of the 
venture (Welch et al., 2007). Licensing arrangements have long been used as a way of seeking 
to control the use of the licensor’s technology, technical and commercial, by foreign partner 
firms (for example foreign outsourcing contractees), as well as trying to prevent unwanted 
dissemination. In general, mode combinations can be constructed in such a way as to 
strengthen intellectual property protection outside formal protection systems (patents, 
                                                                                                                                                        
combination opportunities: e.g. for two countries, 272 = 729; for three countries, 273 = 19683; for four countries, 
274 = 531441; and for five countries 275 = 14348907, i.e. more than 14 million combinations. 
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copyright, etc.). Sales subsidiaries are sometimes used alongside a foreign intermediary in the 
foreign market as a way of extending control over the foreign sales activity and the 
intermediary (Petersen et al., 2001). In some instances an additional mode in a package 
delivers additional returns from a foreign operation, for example in the form of royalty 
payments under a licensing arrangement that operates alongside foreign direct investment 
(Welch et al., 2007).  
Such mode combination steps may be useful in timing terms as well: rather than seeking 
to take over the JV partner when not prepared to do so, extended control could be achieved 
while building towards a move to full subsidiary status. At the same time, adding a mode 
could be a way of easing the process of ultimate primary mode change – additions to the 
original mode/s acting as stepping stones (Petersen et al., 2001; see also Petersen et al., 2010). 
Of course, flexibility would be significantly enhanced when the desired mode option is built 
into the starting mode arrangement (Petersen et al., 2000). In an overall sense, the availability 
of mode combination options provides a company with greater strategic control over when 
and how it develops foreign operations.  
Such flexibility is further augmented by the additional possibilities for role variation 
and adjustment across a mode package: the starting roles performed by modes are not 
necessarily fixed over time. Companies can and do make mode role changes in response to 
developments in their external environment or because of modifications in company strategy. 
Such mode role variation may accompany mode combination changes, but could occur 
without them. For example, the starting mode arrangement for a company in a foreign market 
might be a joint venture with exporting from the home market. The starting roles for the two 
modes could be: the JV acts as a marketing and service base within the foreign market, 
basically to support the exporting activity; exports assist with home plant utilisation, ensuring 
economies of scale at the production level. Over time though the operation within the foreign 
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market may develop in various ways: successful market penetration to the point where 
production in the foreign market becomes feasible; the relationship with the JV partner 
advances to a stage characterised by a high level of trust; and management decides that an 
enhanced facility would be an effective base to service other markets within the same region. 
Thus, the role of the JV is extended to production and its marketing role expanded. While 
exports from the home market diminish, they do not disappear as some intermediary products 
and raw materials are likely to be needed by the JV for some time. Even though the outer shell 
of the mode package remains unchanged, substantial change within occurs because of the 
shift in mode roles. In this respect, mode role changes are not dissimilar to within-mode 
changes in effecting changes without overall mode adjustment (Benito et al., 2009). Taken 
together, the potential to change mode combinations, mode roles and make within-mode 
adjustments delivers many mode options short of substantial mode change, enhanced 
flexibility and the ability to organically stage increased mode commitment within a foreign 
market. 
As the various examples noted illustrate, the path adopted may be in response to 
circumstances that arise in the foreign market: a mode combination may not be the outcome 
of a distinct decision at a given point in time. Learning is likely to be a significant component 
of mode combination adoption or change – reflecting both market learning and mode learning 
(Barnett and Burgelman, 1996). Rather than being a fixed, carefully structured entity, a mode 
combination should be viewed as a fluid and adaptable instrument of foreign market 
penetration.  
From an evolutionary perspective, mode combinations reflect various process 
influences – externally and within a company. Figure 8 shows how a hypothetical company’s 
mode combination might evolve in a foreign market, showing additions and a deletion over 




Figure 8 about here  
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5.2. BARRIERS TO MODE COMBINATION 
Clearly, there are substantial benefits for companies in developing mode packages as a way of 
penetrating foreign markets. The benefits are seemingly so obvious that it begs the question as 
to why such arrangements are not the almost automatic default position for companies in 
devising foreign operation strategies – i.e. instead of what mode, what mode combination 
should be employed? However, Norwegian data (Benito et al., 2011) indicate that mode 
combinations fall well short of being the automatic choice in mode strategy. It could be 
argued that this is because of ignorance: the possibilities are simply not recognised. Other 
explanations are that managers perceive various barriers to mode combinations, and that the 
range of possibilities is seen as somewhat overwhelming.  
One important form of mode combination barrier or constraint might simply be mode 
myopia or mode ignorance (Welch et al., 2007). Research indicates that companies tend to 
consider a limited range of mode options in devising foreign operation strategies, let alone the 
plethora of combination options (Larimo, 1987; Calof, 1993; Petersen et al., 2008). This is 
understandable given the limited exposure to, or experience that managers have in utilising, 
all modes and their combination potential.  
Faced with so many mode and mode combination options, depending on the extent to 
which they are perceived, it is not surprising that many managers fall back on those modes 
they are familiar and comfortable with, and feel confident about using. This may be 
reinforced by the learning experiences that unfold through mode use. As companies and 
managers become experienced and adept at using a given set of modes, there is an automatic 
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tendency to maintain and re-use this strength over time – so-called exploitation learning 
(March, 1991). It becomes harder to introduce a previously unused mode into an existing 
mode package: there is comfort and assurance in the known. There are examples of 
companies using a preferred operation mode over extended periods of internationalisation. 
The British firm Pilkington internationalised its float glass business over a very long period 
pre-eminently via the licensing of foreign manufacturers (Taylor 1994). This is despite the 
fact that the starting mode(s) may have been used without careful analysis in response to an 
approach by a potential foreign customer, distributor, franchisee or licensee – a common 
starting point (Welch et al., 2007).  
Because of inexperience initially, companies may engage in mode experimentation, 
but over time, following feedback, engage in a more constrained approach to mode use. In 
extreme cases, involving what managers regard as highly negative outcomes, the experience 
can lead to the excision of a particular mode or modes from any consideration. For example, 
the private US multinational DDI, a provider of human resource services (talent 
management), entered foreign markets in the 1970s and expanded to 29 countries by 2010 
(Warren-Smith, 2010). In its earlier international forays it used a range of operation modes, 
including wholly-owned subsidiaries, licensing, joint ventures and project operations. By 
2010, this range had been substantially reduced: before 1990 licensing and JVs constituted 
82% of mode use, but this had declined to 23% by 2010, with JVs dropped altogether because 
of perceived problems with this form. In contrast, over the same period, wholly-owned 
subsidiaries had become the dominant form – rising from 12 to 77% of total mode use. The 
ability to provide consistent services to multinational clients was an important driver of the 
shift to wholly-owned subsidiaries, along with control of intellectual property. Thus, a 
company might arrive at a position of considerable mode inertia over time (Benito et al., 
2009), thereby not seriously canvassing other mode, including combination, options. Of 
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course, companies could undertake exploratory learning (March, 1991), deliberately 
researching and expanding mode knowledge, even sending staff to training programs, perhaps 
sparked by emerging pressures for change in different foreign markets, as most long term 
internationalisers tend to experience. But, overall there seems to be less evidence of 
exploratory activities. 
Switching costs have been noted as a further constraining factor in the preparedness of 
companies to adopt new mode constructions (Benito et al., 1999). Existing modes are not 
always readily able to be deleted because of a range of factors – including host government 
and trade union pressure, and the contractual conditions surrounding a particular mode, for 
example limiting the ability to exit the arrangement within a stipulated time frame (Petersen et 
al., 2000). Beyond these constraints there are the set-up costs of adding new modes – not least 
being learning costs. Fixed costs are typically incurred when adding a new mode – even for a 
relatively straightforward addition such as a licensing arrangement: i.e. covering the costs of 
negotiating, writing, and implementing the licence contract. There may also be relationship 
costs in situations where companies are seeking to add a mode to an existing foreign set-up. 
Companies sometimes try to add altered arrangements on top of existing foreign distributor 
connections to advance foreign market penetration – effectively moving to a mode 
combination basis, sometimes as a deliberate prelude to subsidiary establishment (Petersen et 
al., 2001). Not surprisingly, foreign intermediaries are prone to resist such moves, and can 
ensure that their accomplishment is difficult and costly. Mode combination choices, like mode 
choices in general, are constrained, or compromised, by the realities of the situation and 
context they are used in, as well as companies’ own limitations – of resources, and managerial 
vision.  
Last, but not least, the cost of coordinating multiple FOMs may constitute an effective 
barrier to mode combination. A clear-cut division of responsibilities and roles among a 
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number of local operators (including the entrant firm) is, in practise, easier said than done. 
Duplication of tasks and blurred market segmentation may result in inconsistent foreign 
market servicing, and – in turn – confused customers and dissatisfied operators. Poor 
coordination and communication may foster scepticism and competition – rather than 
collaboration – among third-party local operators. From this perspective the entrant firm 
managers may prefer one FOM at a time.  
6. COMBINING MODES INTO PACKAGES 
Our analysis so far has shown that the array of mode combination options is substantial:  there 
are many different ways in which foreign operation modes can be assembled or packaged in 
servicing a given foreign market. While a company could be using various modes in a foreign 
market, they may not necessarily be “combined” i.e. there may be little connection between 
them in terms of how they are used. The use of multiple modes could be because of 
geographical or other forms of market segmentation or because they are used in different parts 
of the value chain (Petersen and Welch, 2002). The Norwegian multinational Norsk Hydro 
had different divisions active in India in the 1990s, using a range of modes, but there was little 
coordination of these activities (Tomassen, Welch and Benito, 1998). Similarly, the 
Australian beer company Foster’s kept their beer and wine operations separate in the US, in 
part because their wine operations resulted from the acquisition of Beringer, a major US wine 
company (Speedy, 2007). The organization of its beer operations in the USA illustrates the 
type of mode arrangement along the value chain that a company may assemble.   
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Foster’s licensed Molson in Canada to brew its beer for the US market, while marketing and 
distribution were undertaken through a JV with the US company Miller Brewing. When 
Molson merged with the US brewer Coors, Foster’s cancelled its licensing agreement with 
Molson and signed one with Miller, thus generating a tighter overall mode package. At the 
same time, all the parts of the value chain in Canada, production, marketing and distribution, 
continued to be handled through a licensing agreement with the newly formed Molson Coors 
(Speedy, 2007). Sometimes different modes are used simultaneously in a foreign market for 
the same type of activity. For example, the Israeli software firm Fundtech performed R&D in 
the US through a joint venture, a greenfield subsidiary and an acquired subsidiary, while its 
marketing and customer support services there were conducted through distributors, a joint 
venture, a greenfield sales office and an acquired subsidiary (Welch et al., 2007). Thus, the 
fact that multiple modes are used by a company may tell us little about the degree to which 
they are packaged together or how they are connected in order to achieve foreign market 
penetration goals. On one end of a connectedness scale we might have two divisions of a 
company (like Norsk Hydro) that use different modes but their operations (and thereby 
modes) are not at all integrated or coordinated. At the other extreme is the type of example 
shown in Figure 10, where modes are tightly connected in a supportive manner around the 
achievement of a set of goals: in general to ensure success of a company’s foreign market 
involvement. The primary mode is a JV, the main vehicle for achieving foreign market 
penetration and revenue generation, with associate modes 1-3 in supportive positions, 
particularly in terms of control.   
------------------------------ 





Competing modes are sometimes used by companies in the same foreign market, even 
targeting the same segment and market area. This often occurs when a company is seeking to 
have an alternative marketing channel to its independent foreign intermediary. In a Danish 
study, 27% of companies retained their independent foreign intermediaries after establishing a 
subsidiary (Pedersen and Petersen, 1998). 
7. PROACTIVE MODE COMBINATION STRATEGY 
Mode combinations have been shown to potentially play an important role in achieving a 
range of companies’ foreign market penetration objectives, and therefore should be 
considered more seriously in the design of international strategy. However, developing a 
coherent and more deliberative mode combination strategy as part of general international 
strategy is not a straightforward exercise, as we have alluded to in previous sections. 
Companies do not have full control over the way that their foreign operations evolve. 
Managers are unlikely to be aware of the full extent of mode combination options, and 
changes may occur on the ground in the foreign market without full strategic assessment by a 
company. Mode strategy is therefore bound to include elements of emergent strategy 
(Mintzberg and Waters, 1985), for example as opportunities and approaches arise in the 
foreign market or in the nearby region. Sales to other markets could develop because of 
general networks maintained by a foreign JV partner. In various ways foreign, not just JV, 
partners (e.g. including intermediaries, licensees and the like) inevitably influence the way a 
company’s foreign operation strategy evolves – often in subtle ways that are not obvious in 
the first place. Mode choices may be emergent initially but can become intended (deliberate) 
over time, even locked-in, as part of a more consistent international mode strategy. Mode 
inertia is a factor (Benito et al., 2009). There is comfort in continuing to employ those modes, 
and mode packages, which a company’s managers have become knowledgeable about and 
adept at using in different foreign markets.  
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Limited evidence indicates that companies make little if any attempt to include mode 
combinations in the development of international strategies, despite the potential benefits for 
international operations noted above, and the reality of their sometimes extensive use (Benito 
et al., 2011). Nevertheless, it is appropriate to ask: in what ways might a more proactive mode 
combination strategy be developed? Of course, any strategic posture regarding mode 
combinations cannot be disconnected from general foreign operation mode strategy – 
covering aspects such as mode choices, mode commitment (resources, etc.), and mode 
switching over time – in existing and new foreign markets. A first step in strategic 
development is to simply recognise the role that mode combinations can potentially play in a 
company’s internationalisation. Beyond recognition there may be an issue of adequate 
knowledge of mode and combination options within a company, or more particularly those 
designing international strategies. There is likely to be the need for learning about different 
modes that have not been employed by the company previously, and building competence in a 
wider range of modes. As Sanchez and Heene (1997) note, competence development is a 
basic way of widening the range of strategic options available to a firm – of enhancing 
strategic flexibility. It is difficult for managers to contemplate employing modes they have not 
used before, have little knowledge of, and lack understanding of as to their potential role: the 
strategic flexibility provided by mode combinations in the evolution of international 
operations will only arise if managers are equipped and prepared to use them – in response, at 
times, to situations where rapid reaction is required. However, the number and complexity of 
mode combination options, particularly when examined at a disaggregated value chain level, 
mean that any consideration of feasible combination strategies has to be necessarily limited in 
scope (Petersen et al. 2008). 
Within the context of a company’s overall foreign operation mode strategy, key steps 
in building in a more proactive strategic approach to mode combinations include: 
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• Establish the current state of mode combination use in different markets. 
• Consider the potential for, and benefit of, expanding combinations; as well as 
potential barriers and how they might be overcome. 
• Develop a plan for mode combination use – including how to deal with possible 
emergent pressures and opportunities; and consider the scope for contractual 
arrangements with built-in switching options. 
• Implementation may require negotiation with foreign partners and expanded 
mode training for local and foreign staff – as a forerunner to any mode 
combination actions. 
8. CONCLUSION 
Thinking strategically about foreign operation modes requires moving beyond making a 
choice for the initial entry into a country. The rethinking about foreign operation modes and 
how they are used in international business activity has ushered in consideration of the reality 
of mode combinations as part of mode strategy. We advance theoretical justification for the 
use of mode combinations. In general, there are strong arguments as to why companies can 
gain significant benefits from building mode combinations, but mode combinations are as 
such no panacea. We have also stressed that there are potential barriers to their adoption, and 
costs in implementing them. Changing modes or mode combinations is not a frictionless 
exercise. Some companies use mode combinations extensively, while others shy away from 
them (Benito et al., 2011). It is not surprising that many companies baulk at the change 
process. Mode learning may be part of the solution, but it should be recognised that learning-
by-doing with respect to already adopted modes may entrench the position of these modes or 
mode combinations, which is supported by growing confidence in their use. Mode learning 




Despite such limitations, there are examples of mode combinations being employed 
successfully, and in creative ways. We suspect that, for many companies, mode combinations 
are assembled almost unconsciously – that they are not seen as anything unique or unusual, 
just part of the response to foreign market pressures and opportunities. This certainly seemed 
to be the case for the Finnish multinational Kone as it penetrated the Japanese market with a 
more complex mode package over time (Benito et al., 2009). But we know little about how 
mode combinations are regarded by companies and how they fit into international strategy: 
our impression is that the strategies we see tend to be emergent strategies.  
Clearly, there is need for a substantial effort on empirical research – both in terms of 
detailed case studies and broad, cross-sectional studies to better understand this phenomenon. 
We also encourage conceptual development based on a modelling approach, of which 
Asmussen et al. (2009) is an example. There is also considerable scope for companies to 
become more knowledgeable about the potential role of mode combinations, and more 
proactive, and strategic, in their use. 
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Figure 5. Immediate full internalisation 
 
 
Figure 6. Internalisation – one step 
 
  









































































































































































Figure 10. Modes packages: an example 
Primary Mode: Joint Venture
• market penetration 
• revenue generation
Associate 
Mode 1:
Licensing
• technology
control
Associate 
Mode 2:
Management
Contract
• management
control
Associate
Mode 3:
Exporting
• domestic
plant
utilisation
Source: adapted from Petersen and Welch (2002), p.161
 
 
